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"The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and
practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals
and institutions with which the law interacts. Few students
and no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an
academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the
exchange of views with which the law is concerned."'
"The lawyer ... is a member of a learned profession - of a
skill group that has the temerity to make a profession of
tendering advice to others. It is his responsibility to acquaint
himself not only with what the learned have thought, and with
the historical trends of his time, but also with the long-term
interests of all whom he serves and the appropriate means of
securing such interests . . . . To no one else can clients and
members of the public reasonably be expected to look for that
enlargement and correction of perspective, that critical and
inclusive view of reality, that is based on the disciplined
exercise of skills which the layman is not given the
opportunity to acquire." 2
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2 Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 211 (1943).
1105
University of California, Davis
INTRODUCTION
Most of the time most Americans take for granted the desirability of
most kinds of "diversity" in higher education. Unlike universities in
some other countries - where university admission may depend
entirely on the results of a single set of school leaving examinations -
American colleges and universities typically do not attempt to fill their
classes by admitting the largest possible number of the highest scorers
on a standardized exam, but choose to consider a variety of factors in
deciding who should be admitted to study. That has been the case for
many years, and it remains the case today, notwithstanding the
pressures put on colleges and universities by the various rankings
regimens (which typically emphasize the grades and test scores of
entering students in determining the relative standing of institutions)
and the weight attributed to those rankings by prospective students.
Moreover, the vast majority of Americans seemingly recognize the
desirability of such multi-factored approaches to college and
university admissions. The desirability - and, indeed, the necessity
- of such approaches is rooted in the peculiar nature of the
contemporary American university: the university orchestra may need
three new violinists and a percussionist, the football team may be
desperate for a new quarterback or a competent placekicker, the
women's soccer team may need two powerful fullbacks, and the
viability of the classics department may depend on admitting more
students with a high level of competence and interest in Latin and
Greek. Similarly, university officials may be concerned about gender
diversity or think that more students with more than average
intellectual curiosity are needed. They may think that more
conservative voices would improve the quality of campus dialogue.
They may be influenced by the need to enroll students who can afford
to attend or they may be mindful of the university's need for alumni
support. But most important, perhaps, is the fact that our particular
system of university education depends on active student learning and
a rigorous exchange of ideas in the classroom - something that works
best with a broad diversity of perspectives. When such needs are
properly explained, most are generally accepted, if not always with
universal approval or enthusiasm.3
3 Among these various factors, the most difficult to defend, except on the most
mercenary of grounds, may be the preferences that stem from a college or university's need
for funding. That is particularly the case, as Justice Thomas has suggested, with so-called
"legacy" preferences. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 367-68 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (" IT]here is much to be said for the view that the
use of tests and other measures to 'predict' academic performance is a poor substitute for a
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To the extent that "diversity" is taken to encompass racial and
ethnic diversity, however, that already fragile consensus gives way to
doubt and disagreement. That is not surprising. After all, Americans
have traditionally viewed higher education, not simply as a good in
itself, but also as an important engine of social mobility, opening
doors that otherwise would have stayed shut. Indeed, our concern
with that purely instrumental value of education sometimes causes us
to minimize its most essential value, namely, the learning that actually
goes on in the classroom. In any event, we know that the stakes are
system that gives every applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in the study of law. The
rallying cry that in the absence of racial discrimination in admissions there would be a true
meritocracy ignores the fact that the entire process is poisoned by numerous exceptions to
'meriL' For example, in the national debate on racial discrimination in higher education
admissions, much has been made of the fact that elite institutions utilize a so-called 'legacy'
preference to give children of alumni an advantage in admissions. This, and other,
exceptions to a 'true' meritocracy give the lie to protestations that merit admissions are in
fact the order of the day at the Nation's universities. The Equal Protection Clause does not,
however, prohibit the use of unseemly legacy preferences or many other kinds of arbitrary
admissions procedures."). As indicated both by Justice Thomas's expressed suspicion with
respect to the predictive value of tests and other customary forms of measurement, and by
his obviously deliberate use of quotation marks in the foregoing passage, the meaning and
significance of "merit" and "true" meritocracy is, within certain bounds, far from self-
evident. In the final analysis, it may be difficult to define merit except in terms of the
relative contributions that university officials expect that students with particular
backgrounds and experiences will make to a particular community of learners, and that is
the kind of academic judgment that is normally thought to rest within the ken of university
officials, rather than the courts. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,
225 (1985) ("When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic
decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the faculty's professional
judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from
accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did
not actually exercise professional judgment."); Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz,
435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) ("Like the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade
for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic
reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted
to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking."). In any event, given
the acute resource needs faced by many colleges and universities at the present time, the
temptation for university administrators to consider such matters in the context of
ostensibly unrelated decision-making processes may be easily understood. On the other
hand, succumbing to that temptation is not easily justified. See MICHAEL MITCHELL ET AL.,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, FUNDING DowN, TUrnON UP: STATE CUTS TO HIGHER
EDUCATION THREATEN QUALITY AND AFFORDABILITY AT PUBLIC COLLEGES 1 (2016),
httpsJ/www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/5-19-16sfp.pdf; Kim Clark, Some Small
Private Colleges Are Facing a "Death Spiral," TIME: MONEY (Mar. 4, 2015),
httpI/time.com/money/3731250/sweet-briar-private-college-death-spiral; Jon Marcus, The
Looming Decline -of the Public Research University, WASH. MONTHLY (SeptJOct. 2017),
httpJ/washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/septemberoctober-2017/the-looming-decline-of-
the-public-research-university.
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high. In addition, the morally repellent causes with which
consciousness of race and ethnicity have traditionally been associated
- slavery, segregation, institutional racism, quotas, and other forms
of overt discrimination against members of various racial and ethnic
groups - have made us, and our law, understandably skeptical of
measures that require acknowledgments of race or ethnicity.4 Not
surprisingly, we are often beguiled by the simplicity of Justice Harlan's
dictum in Plessy v. Ferguson5 - that "[o]ur Constitution is color-
blind,"6 and we are inclined to take those words as a literal guide to
action, without regard to what Justice Harlan might actually have
meant by them or how well, taken literally, their alluring simplicity
will map the complexity of our present circumstances. On the other
hand, we recognize that acknowledgments of difference are necessary
if invidious discrimination is to be prevented in the present and the
effects of past discrimination remedied. In our more sober moments,
we know that a fundamentalist understanding of Justice Harlan's
dictum cannot carry us through. We know, as Judge Wisdom has said,
that our Constitution must be "both color blind and color conscious."7
4 See, e.g., Mark H. Grunewald, Quotas, Politics, and Judicial Statesmanship: The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Powell's Bakke, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 53, 57-59 (1992)
(discussing the rhetorical power of the word "quota"). More recently, we have become
increasingly aware of the pernicious effects of implicit bias. See, e.g., Anthony G.
Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 945, 966 (2006) ("[A] substantial and actively accumulating body of research
evidence establishes that implicit race bias is pervasive and is associated with
discrimination against African Americans."); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 969, 971 (2006) ("Ilmplicit bias as measured
by the [Implicit Association Test] has proven to be extremely widespread. Most
people tend to prefer white to African-American, young to old, and heterosexual to
gay. Strikingly, members of traditionally disadvantaged groups tend to show the same
set of preferences.").
5 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6 Id. at 559.
7 United States v. Jefferson Cry. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d. 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966);
see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("[Als an
aspiration, Justice Harlan's axiom must command our assent. In the real world, it is
regrettable to say, it cannot be a universal constitutional principle."). In recent times,
the "strict scrutiny" standard of review, requiring the demonstration of a "compelling"
state interest and a means "narrowly tailored" to achieve that interest, has provided
the jurisprudential framework for implementing Justice Harlan's dictum. See, e.g.,
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (Powell, J.) (articulating
the "strict scrutiny" or "most exacting judicial examination" standard of judicial
review). As Stephen Siegel has shown, however, "[s]trict scrutiny did not appear in
[Fourteenth Amendment] equal protection racial discrimination cases until 1978. In
that year, Justice Powell, who was not speaking for the Court, employed strict scrutiny
[Vol. 51:11051108
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In fact, we know that we cannot succeed at being "color-blind" unless
we are "color-conscious." In addition, we recognize, as Justice Harlan
also observed in Plessy, that "[t]he destinies of the two races, in this
country, are indissolubly linked together. . . ."8 Indeed, we are a
nation of many races and ethnicities, and the destinies of all our
people are linked together within our democratic institutions -
which ultimately depend on "trustful talk among strangers." 9
It is not surprising, then, that questions concerning the purpose and
value of racial and ethnic diversity in higher education have been the
subject of substantial public discussion, academic scholarship, and
hard-fought litigation over the half-century since the time when racial
and ethnic diversity first became a major concern of colleges and
in casting the deciding vote in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke[, 438
U.S. 265 (1978)]. It was not until 1984 that an opinion for the Court employed strict
scrutiny in a racial discrimination case." Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the
Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 58 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 402 (2006)
(footnote omitted). "[I]t was not until the Burger and Rehnquist Courts' attack on
affirmative action, in the late 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, that the Court found in the
Equal Protection Clause a firm principle - the 'colorblind Constitution' - that
proscribed racial classifications even when their purpose and effect was to benefit
historically oppressed minorities. Although it was the Burger and Rehnquist Court
that turned the Equal Protection Clause from an anti-racial-subordination into an
anti-racial-classification provision, it was the Warren Court's politically 'cautious'
rhetoric in McLaughlin [v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)] and Loving [v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967)] that laid the groundwork." Id. at 405 (footnotes omitted); see also Reva
B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1470, 1474-75 (2004) ("The understanding
that anticlassification and antisubordination are competing principles that vindicate
different complexes of values and justify different doctrinal regimes is an outgrowth of
decades of struggle over Brown, and is not itself a ground of the decision or of the
earliest debates it prompted."). Clearly, the Court did not invoke "strict scrutiny" in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), but the Court did suggest in Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a companion case involving school segregation in the
District of Columbia (to which the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply), that
"[cilassifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care,
since they are contrary to our traditions . . . ." Id. at 499; see also Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., StrictJudicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1276 (2007) (noting that the Bolling
Court used "language that anticipates the modem approach"). In Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), of course, Justice Black wrote that "all legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group [are] subject . .. to
the most rigid scrutiny," and Justice Stone had suggested that certain classifications
and rights might warrant "a more exacting judicial scrutiny" in United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
8 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560.
9 DANIELLE S. ALLEN, TALKING TO STRANGERS: ANXIETIES OF CITIZENSHIP SINCE
BRowN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION xiii (2004) ("[Plroperly conducted, [such talk] should
dissolve any divisions that block it.").
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universities. Nor is it surprising that questions about the legitimacy,
legality, and efficacy of various means of achieving such diversity have
been the subject of much attention, not only from the academic
community and the courts, but also from the general public. Finally, it
is not surprising, in these circumstances, that questions of pedagogy
and sound educational policy have often seemed to take second seat to
other issues.
What may indeed seem surprising, however, is that the Supreme
Court has considered the constitutionality of "benign" race-conscious
admissions programs in higher education in only five cases since the
issue first took hold in the late 1960s. 10 The Court first considered the
question in its badly splintered 1978 decision in Board of Regents v.
Bakke,1 which involved an affirmative action program at the UC Davis
medical school. Justice Powell, who announced the judgment of the
Court, recognized that, "[riacial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are
inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination,"1 2 but that the ability of a university to determine who
should be admitted to study was a central aspect of academic
freedom.' 3 As a general matter, therefore, Justice Powell did not think
that universities were categorically prohibited from any consideration
of race in admissions decisions, but he found that UC Davis's
particular admissions plan, which simply set aside a specific number
of seats for minority applicants, was unconstitutional. For a race-
conscious admissions plan to pass muster, Justice Powell emphasized,
each applicant must be considered individually and race may be
considered only as a "plus factor" in the overall decision.1 4 Although
no other Justice joined Justice Powell on both points - that race-
conscious university admissions plans are not categorically
unconstitutional, but the UC Davis plan was unconstitutional - his
opinion came to be widely accepted as standing for the holding of the
10 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher 11), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. (Fisher 1), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978).
ii Bakke, 438 U.S. 265. The Court granted certiorari to address the
constitutionality of a law school admissions plan in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974), but that case eventually became moot because the plaintiff, who had sought
admission to the University of Washington Law School, had been granted admission
to the law school as interlocutory relief and was close to graduation by the time that a
decision was about to be rendered by the Supreme Court. Id. at 319-20.
12 See id. at 291 (Powell, J.).
13 See id. at 312-13 (Powell, J.).
14 Id. at 316-18.
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case. The Court later decided a number of cases in which it virtually
precluded any consideration of race, as a practical matter, in a variety
of other contexts,15 but it did not expressly repudiate Justice Powell's
analysis, insofar as higher education was concerned; nor did it revisit
the subject for the next twenty-five years. In 1996, however, the Fifth
Circuit held in Hopwood v. Texas16 that Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke was neither a binding precedent nor a correct statement of the
law' - a development that set the stage for further consideration of
the issue by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court finally revisited the issue in 2003, when it
decided two cases involving race-conscious admissions programs at
the University of Michigan: Grutter v. Bollinger18 and Gratz v.
Bollinger.19 Following Justice Powell's approach in Bakke, the Grutter
15 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510-11 (1989)
(invalidating municipal contract set-aside program); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 282-84 (1986) (invalidating collective bargaining provisions requiring
race-conscious teacher lay-offs). In Croson and Wygant, the Court struck down state
racial classifications intended to benefit certain minority groups by applying a
demanding version of strict scrutiny review. By contrast, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 473-74, 491-92 (1980), and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547,
564-66 (1990), the Court upheld similarly "benign" federal racial classifications under
less demanding standards of review. In Metro Broadcasting, for example, the Court not
only noted that "[a] majority of the Court in Fullilove did not apply strict scrutiny,"
but specifically invoked the test applicable to intermediate scrutiny, holding that such
classifications "are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve important
governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to
the achievement of those objectives." Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564, 565. In
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Petia, 515 U.S. 200, 235-39 (1995), however, the Court
held that the strict scrutiny standard that it applied to the state programs at issue in
Croson and Wygant should also be applied to federal programs. In the lead opinion in
Adarand, Justice O'Connor emphasized that "strict scrutiny is [not necessarily] 'strict
in theory, but fatal in fact,"' id. at 237, whereas Justice Scalia observed "government
can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race to 'make
up' for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction." Id. at 239. See generally
Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104 COLUM. L.
REv. 60, 62-66 (2004) (presenting a "thumbnail sketch of the doctrinal history of
competing versions of the 'compelling state interest' formula, from Bakke in 1978 to
Grutter in 2003").
16 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
17 See id. at 944 ("Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this
issue. While he announced the judgment, no other Justice joined in that part of the
opinion discussing the diversity rationale."); see also id. at 945 ("In short, there has
been no indication from the Supreme Court, other than Justice Powell's lonely
opinion in Bakke, that the state's interest in diversity constitutes a compelling
justification for governmental race-based discrimination.").
18 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
19 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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Court upheld the law school's admissions program, which gave
individualized consideration to each applicant, but the Court in Gratz
struck down the undergraduate admissions program, which
automatically awarded a fixed number of points to applicants based on
race.20 A decade later, in Fisher v. University of Texas,21 the Court
granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of another race-
conscious undergraduate admissions program. 22 It was widely
anticipated that the Fisher Court would overrule Grutter, but that did
not happen.23 The Fisher Court vacated the judgment and remanded
the case to the Fifth Circuit, whereupon further proceedings were held
in that court, followed by a second grant of certiorari and an eventual
Supreme Court decision upholding the Texas undergraduate
admissions program by a divided vote. 24 The complicated history of
20 Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334-35 (holding that the Law School's "truly
individualized consideration" of applicants, taking race into account in a "flexible,
nonmechanical way" satisfied the narrow tailoring requirement), with Gratz, 539 U.S.
at 271-76 (holding that Michigan's undergraduate admissions program, which
provided no "such individualized consideration," but "automatically distribute[d] 20
points to every single applicant from an 'underrepresented minority,"' did not satisfy
the narrow tailoring requirement).
21 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher 1), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
22 See Brief for Petitioner at i, Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345)
("Question Presented: Whether the University of Texas at Austin's use of race in
undergraduate admissions decisions is lawful under this Court's decisions interpreting
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).").
23 That expectation was based in part on a 2007 decision in which the Court
struck down race-conscious student assignment plans that had been adopted by the
Seattle, Washington, and Jefferson County, Kentucky, school districts. See Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747-48 (2007)
(plurality opinion). Chief Justice Roberts, in a plurality opinion, would have barred
any consideration of race. See id. at 746-48. Justice Kennedy, whose vote was
necessary to the outcome, specifically rejected that view as an "all-too-unyielding
insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when, in my view, it may be taken
into account." Id. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). In Fisher I, the Court vacated the decision of the Fifth Circuit, holding
that the lower court had not properly applied the strict scrutiny standard since it had
applied a "good faith" standard and had accorded a presumption of good faith to the
university, thereby essentially shifting the burden to the party challenging the
university's position. Fisher 1, 133 S. Ct. at 2420-22. Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Court, reiterated his view that the consideration of race was not categorically
precluded, and that deference was due to a university's academic judgment concerning
the importance of diversity. Id. at 2417-18. Justice Ginsburg dissented and Justices
Scalia and Thomas wrote separate concurring opinions essentially adhering to their
positions in Grutter. Id. at 2432-24 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see id. at 2422 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); id. at 2422-32 (Thomas, J., concurring).
24 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207, 2209-10, 2214-15
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the Fisher case would make an interesting story, but the focus of this
Article is on Grutter. More specifically, this Article will explore the
significance and ramifications of the Grutter majority's relative lack of
emphasis on the fact that Grutter involved legal education - a
distinctive form of higher education with a distinctive mission, a
distinctive set of concerns, and a distinctive pedagogy.
The Grutter Court was required to distinguish several public
contract and employment cases in which it had categorically
foreclosed any consideration of race. Justice O'Connor did so by
observing that "context matters,"25 and that the admissions process in
higher education is a special context. 26 Since Grutter involved access
to legal education, she might have taken the notion of context a step
further and focused on legal education as a distinctive sector within
the more general context of higher education. Interestingly, she did
not do so. Simplicity presumably argued in favor of distinguishing all
of public higher education from other parts of the public sector, and
the Court was already concerned in Grutter and Gratz with the task of
drawing a line between legitimate and illegitimate ways of taking race
into account. Although one can readily show the desirability of
student diversity throughout higher education, the arguments in favor
of diversity in legal education are particularly compelling.
The most important problems that lawyers and judges face normally
do not come with self-evident solutions; they are not logical puzzles,
but questions of real life that require the application of professional
imagination and judgment.27 Among other things, lawyers and judges
must be able to understand and appreciate the significance of
problems as they appear to persons whose perspectives differ from
their own. 28 That is not a talent that comes naturally to us, but it is
(2016). In Fisher II, the Court, by a 4-3 vote, found that the Fifth Circuit had properly
applied the strict scrutiny test on remand.
25 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
26 Id. at 329.
27 See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 6 (1948)
("IA]mbiguity is inevitable in both statute and constitution as well as with case law.
Hence reasoning by example operates with all three."); LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL
REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT 4-5 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the
centrality of analogy to legal reasoning, but acknowledging the absence of rules "that
prescribe how much or what sort of similarity is enough to sustain analogies generally
or to sustain a particular analogy").
28 A quarter acre plot may not have the same meaning for someone who comes
from a rural area as it does for someone who lives in Chicago; someone who has not
been stopped regularly and without apparent reason by the police may have a different
view of it than someone who has; someone who lives in a trailer may consider it a
home while someone else may consider it a vehicle; and an elderly man may have
2018] 1113
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something that can be learned and is essential both to' successful
judging and to successful legal practice.29 The practice of law is by
nature an adversarial activity in which a lawyer must seek to advance
the interests of his or her client. Whether in litigation or transactional
practice, however, the effective lawyer is one who is capable not only
of understanding and appreciating the values, motivations, and
interests of his or her client, but also of understanding and genuinely
appreciating the values, motivations, and interests of the other parties
to the dispute or transaction. The effective lawyer must also have an
accurate, deep, and nuanced understanding of how the other parties'
values, motivations, and interests diverge or converge with those of his
or her client, and the effective lawyer must be able to counsel and
otherwise represent his or her client in accordance with that
knowledge.
For those reasons, the cultivation of professional imagination and
judgment is (or should be) a central concern of legal education. But
professional imagination and judgment are not learned in a lecture
hall, imparted from the podium by an omniscient teacher who has
fairly considered every aspect and nuance of a problem. To be sure,
the cultivation of such qualities demands a great deal from teachers,
but what it requires is not individual omniscience. It requires a
teacher's careful direction of a respectful dialogue in which students
with various backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives are
encouraged to bring their various individual resources to bear as they
difficulty appreciating what it means to an adolescent girl to be strip searched in
school. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 374 (2009)
(stating that a junior high school student's "subjective expectation of privacy against
[a strip] search [was] inherent in her account of it as embarrassing"); Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407-08 (2005) (rejecting petitioner's contention that a dog
sniff search during a traffic stop violated his constitutional rights); California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1985) (reversing the California Supreme Court's
decision that a trailer home is not an automobile for Fourth Amendment purposes);
see also Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009 CARDozo L.
REV. DE*NOVO 133, 143 [hereinafter Bandes, Empathetic Judging] ("Unless the Court
could understand the perspectives of all the litigants, it risked making its ultimate
determination based on skewed and incomplete information.").
29 See Barry Sullivan, Just Listening: The Equal Hearing Principle and the Moral Life
of Judges, 48 Loy. U. CHi. LJ. 351, 366 (2016) [hereinafter Sullivan, Just Listening]
("Successful advocates cannot afford to be blinded by the brilliance of their own
arguments, but must always be vigilant as to both the weaknesses of their arguments
and the strengths of the best arguments on the other side."); Barry Sullivan, The
Humanity of Advocacy, 42 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. xxiii, xxv (2010) (stating that the advocate's
task is nothing less than "to persuade the court that the world will be a better place, in
one way or another, by a little or a lot, if the court accepts the advocate's
submission").
[Vol. 51:11051114
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work through a set of difficult and contentious problems. Persons
from different regions, social backgrounds, and financial resources
may have particular insights into those problems. Clearly, women, by
virtue of their gender and life experience, often bring special
perspectives to law school discussions and raise concerns that might
otherwise be overlooked. The same is true of members of racial and
ethnic groups. As Justice O'Connor observed in Grutter, "[jlust as
growing up in a particular region or having particular professional
experiences is likely to affect an individual's views, so too is one's
own, unique experience of being a racial minority in a society."30
Indeed, it has become all too clear in recent years that young Black
males are likely to share experiences that are not shared by others and
are highly relevant to the study of law. By declining to discuss context
at a more granular level, however, Justice O'Connor missed the
opportunity to probe the distinctive attributes and needs of legal
education, which effectively permitted the dissenters in Grutter to
define legal education and legal practice in a way that not only denied
the distinctiveness of legal education and practice, but made racial and
ethnic diversity - or, indeed, diversity of any kind - simply
irrelevant.
This Article has four parts. First, the Article will consider Justice
Powell's seminal opinion in Bakke and the Fifth Circuit's challenge to
it in Hopwood. By taking race to be a relevant category for purposes of
considering diversity, Justice Powell implicitly recognized that being
perceived as belonging to a particular racial group constitutes a
relevant, independent part of one's life experience. The Hopwood court
simply rejected that possibility. Second, the Article reviews the
approach taken by Justice O'Connor in Grutter and Gratz, which
substantially reaffirms Justice Powell's methodology for evaluating
race-conscious admissions decisions and speaks to the broad
landscape of higher education, without giving special consideration to
the distinctiveness of legal education. The Article then discusses the
Grutter dissents of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, which reflect
strong views about legal education, lawyering, and judging. In
particular, those dissenting opinions do not seem to credit the
fundamentally interactive nature of legal education (which gives
salience to the diverse life experiences and viewpoints of students) or
to the necessary role of judgment and imagination in lawyering and
adjudication (which requires an openness to the perspectives of others
that legal education should at least begin to habituate). Third, the
30 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
2018] 1115
University of California, Davis
Article presents an alternative to the Grutter dissenters' views of legal
education, lawyering, and judging. That alternative view is one in
which professional excellence in lawyering and judging does not
depend on "law all the way down," in a narrow sense that obviates the
need for individual judgment, but on a capacity for professional
imagination and judgment that is capable of comprehending, as fully
as possible, the competing demands of contending narratives and
realities. Finally, the Article concludes with reflections on the
importance of considering diversity in specific contexts.
I. BAKKE AND HOPWOOD
In Bakke, the California Supreme Court struck down a UC Davis
medical school affirmative action program that set aside sixteen places
for minority students in an entering class of one hundred. The
California court also held that any consideration of race by public
university admissions officials would be unconstitutional. 31 When the
case reached the Supreme Court of the United States, the Justices were
badly divided and expressed a variety of views concerning race-
conscious admissions programs in six separate opinions. The Justices
split into two groups: those who believed that race-conscious
admissions programs were (or could be) constitutional and those who
thought that any consideration of race was unconstitutional, except
for specific remedial purposes. While a majority of the Justices upheld
the California court's holding that the medical school's specific
program was unlawful, a different majority rejected the California
court's conclusion that any consideration of race was categorically
prohibited.32 Thus, a majority of the Court seemingly left open the
31 See Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 553 P.2d 1152, 1163, 1171-72 (Cal.
1976). The California Supreme Court reached this result over the dissent of one
justice. See id. at 1172-92 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
32 Justice Brennan, writing for himself, Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice
Blackmun, observed that:
The difficulty of the issue presented - whether government may use race-
conscious programs to redress the continuing effects of past discrimination
- and the mature consideration which each of our Brethren has brought to
it have resulted in many opinions, no single one speaking for the Court. But
this should not and must not mask the central meaning of today's opinions:
Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult
any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past
racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made by
judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act in this
area.
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possibility that universities could endeavor to achieve racial and ethnic
diversity in other ways.33 Justice Powell, who announced the judgment
of the Court, explained:
For the reasons stated in the following opinion, I believe that
so much of the judgment of the California court as holds [the
Medical School's] special admissions program unlawful and
directs that [Bakke] be admitted to the Medical School must
be affirmed. For the reasons expressed in a separate opinion,
my Brothers the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist and Mr. Justice Stevens concur in this judgment.
I also conclude for the reasons stated in the following opinion
that the portion of the [California] court's judgment enjoining
[the Medical School] from according any consideration to race
in its admissions process must be reversed. For reasons
expressed in separate opinions, my Brothers Mr. Justice
Brennan, Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr.
Justice Blackmun concur in this judgment.34
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324-25 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). As Justice Brennan further noted, the Chief
Justice, together with Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Stevens, would have held that
Bakke's statutory rights were violated, and that he was entitled to prevail for that
reason alone. See id. at 325. Justice Brennan also noted that Justice Powell had
concluded that "although race may be taken into account in university admissions, the
particular special admissions program . . . was not shown to be necessary to achieve
petitioner's stated goals." Id. Thus, "these Members of the Court form a majority of
five affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of California insofar as it holds that
respondent Bakke 'is entitled to an order that he be admitted to the University."' Id.
On the other hand, as Justice Brennan also wrote, "Mr. Justice Powell agrees that some
uses of race in university admissions are permissible and, therefore, joins with
[Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun] to make five votes reversing the
judgment below insofar as it prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious
programs in the future." Id. at 326. In addition to the opinions filed by Justice Powell,
Justice Brennan (on behalf of himself, justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice
Blackmun), and Justice Stevens (on behalf of himself, Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Stewart, and Justice Rehnquist), Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun each filed
separate opinions. Id. at 379-87 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 387-402 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 402-08
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33 See id. at 315 (Powell, J.).
34 Id. at 271-72. Four Justices - Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Rehnquist, and Stevens - did not reach the constitutional question because they
thought that the admissions program was unlawful under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. See id. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Title VI ground had not initially been briefed or argued by the parties, but was the
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No Justice concurred in both portions of Justice Powell's opinion. As
noted, although Justice Powell thought that UC Davis's quota was
unconstitutional, he also thought that a university's perceived need for
racial and ethnic diversity could constitute a compelling state interest
that would satisfy strict scrutiny if it were implemented by narrowly
tailored means.35 An applicant's race could therefore be considered as
a "plus factor" in the admissions process, but only if that process
ensured that the qualifications of individual students were individually
evaluated. 36 Justice Powell thought that strict scrutiny should apply to
any consideration of race (whether "benign" or not),37 but that strict
scrutiny would not necessarily be fatal.3 8 That conclusion followed, in
subject of supplemental briefs requested by the Court. Id. at 281 (Powell, J.). Four
otherJustices -Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun - thought that the
program did not violate Title VI or the Constitution. See id. at 325-27 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Only Justice Powell concluded that the
medical school's specific program was unlawful, while also believing that race-
conscious admissions programs were not categorically unconstitutional. Justice Powell
recognized that the dizzying array of opinions did nothing to make the Court's
holding transparent. For that reason, he delivered an oral summary of the opinions
from the bench, but he did not include that summary in his published opinion. See,
e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION 97-104 (1992) (describing
Justice Powell's oral summary and explanation).
35 See Bakhe, 438 U.S. at 312-13 (Powell, J.) (explaining that the attainment of a
diverse student body "clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of
higher education," and that "[alcademic freedom, though not a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment"). An early empirical study tested Justice Powell's thesis by asking
students at Harvard Law School and the University of Michigan Law School about the
influence of diversity on their educational experiences. See Gary Orfield & Dean
Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences in Leading Law Schools, in
DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 143, 143-44
(Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001). The study concluded that "large
majorities [of the students at these two law schools] have experienced powerful
educational experiences from interactions with students of other races." Id. at 172.
36 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-18.
37 See id. at 291 ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect
and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."). Four Justices - Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun - thought that benign considerations of
race, such as those embodied in university affirmative action programs, should be
evaluated under intermediate scrutiny. See id. at 355-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The other four Justices did not reach the issue because
they based their decision on statutory grounds, but they thought that "[r]ace cannot
be the basis of excluding anyone from participation in a federally funded program." Id.
at 417-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38 In so doing, Justice Powell implicitly rejected Gerald Gunther's suggestion that
strict scrutiny necessarily was "'strict' in theory, fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther,
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
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Justice Powell's view, from a proper recognition that the First
Amendment protects "'the four essential freedoms' of a university -
to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study." 39 Justice Powell wrote:
The atmosphere of "speculation, experiment and creation" -
so essential to the quality of higher education - is widely
believed to be promoted by a diverse student body. As the
Court noted in Keyishian [v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967)], it is not too much to say that the "nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure" to the
ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many
peoples.
Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the
right to select those students who will contribute the most to
the "robust exchange of ideas," [the University] invokes a
countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First
Amendment. In this light, [the University] must be viewed as
seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in
the fulfillment of its mission.
It may be argued that there is greater force to these views at
the undergraduate level than in a medical school where the
training is centered primarily on professional competency. But
even at the graduate level, our tradition and experience lend
support to the view that the contribution of diversity is
substantial. In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950), the
Court made a similar point with special reference to legal
education:
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972).
39 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (Powell, J.) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Significantly, justice Powell
served as a trustee of Washington and Lee University for seventeen years. Robert E.R.
Huntley, A Tribute to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 13, 13 (1999).
Huntley, a former president of the University who served during Justice Powell's time
as a trustee, wrote in a memorial tribute: "In the 1960s, he was among those on the
Board who led affirmation of the faculty's role in academic matters, in the
admission of qualified students of all races, and in permitting and encouraging the
presentation of diverse viewpoints." Id. at 14. But his views of higher education were
not uncritical. See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr.,
Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce 5-6 (Aug. 23, 1971),
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimagesfPowell%2OArchives/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf.
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The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and
practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the
individuals and institutions with which the law interacts.
Few students and no one who has practiced law would
choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the
interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which
the law is concerned.
Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An otherwise
qualified medical student with a particular background -
whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or
disadvantaged - may bring to a professional school of
medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the
training of its student body and better equip its graduates to
render with understanding their vital service to humanity.4 0
Justice Powell took a broad view of professional education (including
legal education, as indicated by his reference to Sweatt v. Painter),
recognizing that its purpose is not simply to provide students with
information or skills, but to cultivate professional judgment and
imagination through exposure to "the ideas and mores of students as
diverse as this Nation of many peoples," so as to prepare them "to
render with understanding their vital service to humanity." 41 For
Justice Powell, the key point was that a student's "particular
background - whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged
or disadvantaged" could be the source of "experience, outlooks, and
ideas that enrich" the educational experience of all.42 The objective
was pedagogical and professional: to help students of medicine or law
become more effective physicians and lawyers. In addition, as shown
by his specific enumeration of relevant factors, justice Powell
recognized that racial or ethnic identity may be as relevant to
"experiences, outlooks, and ideas" as geography or cultural
background. Race - like geography or cultural advantage or
disadvantage or economic or social status - is an independent source
of relevant experience. Thus, Justice Powell thought it constitutionally
permissible for "race or ethnic background [to] be deemed a 'plus' in a
particular applicant's file . . . ."43
4 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-14 (footnotes omitted).
41 Id. at 313, 314.
42 Id. at 314.
43 Id. at 317; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 333 (2003) (emphasizing
the "unique experience of being a racial minority in a society . . . .").
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Although no other Justice concurred in both parts of Justice Powell's
opinion, the lower courts - perhaps influenced by their need for
precedent, the seemingly intractable disagreement among the Justices,
and the common-sense appeal of Justice Powell's position - tended to
view Justice Powell's opinion as authoritative.44 Within the judiciary,
that understanding became more fixed as the years passed and the
Supreme Court failed to revisit the question. In the larger community,
however, the issue remained contentious; it was tailor-made for the
culture wars of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.
Moreover, the Supreme Court indirectly cast doubt on the stability of
Bakke when it later applied strict scrutiny in a way that virtually
prohibited any consideration of race,45 except as a remedy for past
discrimination, in other contexts, such as public contracting and
employment.46 Nonetheless, the lower courts continued to take
+4 In Grutter, Justice O'Connor later wrote, "Since this Court's splintered decision
in Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has served as
the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies."
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323. One question presented in Grutter was whether Justice
Powell's opinion was truly "precedential" under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188
(1977). However, Justice O'Connor found it unnecessary to answer that question
because the Grutter majority did not simply rely on the precedent of Justice Powell's
opinion, but actually "endorse[dI [his] view that student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions." Id.
at 325.
45 Two years after its decision in Bakke, the Supreme Court, in another badly
splintered set of opinions, upheld a federal set-aside program under Congress's
spending power. See Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 491-92 (1980). Thereafter,
the Court consistently invalidated any non-remedial consideration of race in a variety
of governmental contexts. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 510-11 (1989) (invalidating municipal contract set-aside program); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-84 (1986) (invalidating collective bargaining
provisions requiring race-conscious teacher lay-offs); Karst, supra note 15 (presenting
a "thumbnail sketch of the doctrinal history of competing versions of the 'compelling
state interest' formula, from Bakke in 1978 to Grutter in 2003"). The Court initially
applied a less demanding standard of review to the federal government's "benign" use
of racial classifications, see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65
(1990) and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473-74 (1980), but subsequently
decided that a more demanding standard of review should also be applied in reviewing
federal legislation. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 237-39
(1995).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987) (upholding
race-conscious promotion policy to remedy long-term, blatant, and continuous
discrimination); Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,
482-83 (1986) (upholding court-ordered minority membership goal for a union that
had intentionally discriminated against minorities); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979) (upholding race-conscious employment efforts
designed to redress past discrimination if the efforts are temporary and do not violate
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seriously Justice Powell's reliance on academic freedom as a First
Amendment value and continued to treat his opinion in Bakke as
authoritative in its own sphere.4 7
That changed in 1996, when the Fifth Circuit decided Hopwood v.
Texas.48 In that case, a three-judge panel, with Judge Wiener specially
concurring, struck down a public law school admissions plan, not
because it did not comply with the requirements articulated by Justice
Powell in Bakke, but because the court thought that Justice Powell's
opinion was neither a binding precedent nor a correct statement of the
law.49 The panel majority agreed with the plaintiffs that student body
"diversity is not a compelling governmental interest under
superseding Supreme Court precedent," and that "only the remedial
use of race is compelling."5 0 The court wrote:
We agree . . . that any consideration of race or ethnicity by the
law school for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body
is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote
and has never represented the view of a majority of the Court
in Bakke or any other case. Moreover, subsequent Supreme
Court decisions regarding education state that non-remedial
state interests will never justify racial classifications. Finally,
the classification of persons on the basis of race for the
purpose of diversity frustrates, rather than facilitates, the goals
of equal protection.
5 1
In reaching these conclusions, the Hopwood panel majority relied
heavily on the fact that no other Justice had joined Justice Powell's
the rights of white workers).
47 See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1199-201 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was binding authority as to
diversity in higher education, notwithstanding seemingly contrary Supreme Court
authority in other contexts). But see Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263
F.3d 1234, 1247-51 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that Justice Powell's diversity rationale
was not binding precedent).
48 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
9 Id. at 944. Although Judge Wiener rejected the majority's view "that diversity
can never be a compelling governmental interest in a public graduate school," id. at
962 (Wiener, J., concurring), he concurred in the judgment because he thought that
the Texas plan did not meet the narrow tailoring requirement for strict scrutiny, on
the one hand, and could not be justified as necessary to remedy the effects of past
discrimination, on the other hand. Id. at 962-64.
50 Id. at 944.
51 Id. (emphasis added).
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opinion in its entirety or even mentioned the word "diversity." 52 In
addition, the panel majority placed great reliance on inferences it drew
from the Court's post-Bakke, non-higher-education jurisprudence,
principally Adarand Constructors v. Petia (which dealt with
government contract set-asides), to hold that "the use of race to
achieve a diverse student body, whether as a proxy for permissible
characteristics, simply cannot be a state interest compelling enough to
meet ... strict scrutiny."53 If Justice Powell's opinion had ever
warranted deference (which the panel majority denied), it no longer
did. Moreover, in the panel majority's view, there was nothing to
distinguish diversity in higher education from diversity in any other
area of life. The panel made clear that race and context were both
irrelevant:
The use of race, in and of itself, to choose students simply
achieves a student body that looks different. Such a criterion is
no more rational on its own terms than would be choices
based upon the physical size or blood type of applicants. Thus,
the Supreme Court has long held that governmental actors
cannot justify their decisions solely because of race. See, e.g.,
Croson, 488 U.S. at 496 (plurality opinion); Bakke, 438 U.S. at
307 (opinion of Powell, J.).
Accordingly, we see the caselaw as sufficiently established that
the use of ethnic diversity simply to achieve racial
heterogeneity, even as part of the consideration of a number of
factors, is unconstitutional. Were we to decide otherwise, we
would contravene precedent that we are not authorized to
challenge.4
On the other hand, Judge Wiener recognized in his concurring
opinion that context was critically important:
[I1f I had no choice but to address compelling interest I would
do so in the context in which the issue is presented, i.e., the
constitutionally permissible means of constructing an
entering . . . class at a public graduate or professional school.
52 See id.
53 Id. at 944-45, 948. Given the state of the Supreme Court jurisprudence, Judge
Wiener found the majority's approach unpersuasive: "Until further clarification issues
from the Supreme Court, defining 'compelling interest' (or telling us how to know one
when we see one), I perceive no 'compelling' reason to rush in where the Supreme
Court fears - or at least declines - to tread." See id. at 965 (Wiener, J., concurring).
54 Id. at 945-46 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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This unique context, first identified by Justice Powell, differs
from the employment context, differs from the minority
business set aside context, and differs from the re-districting
context; it comprises only the public higher education context
and implicates the uneasy marriage of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Consequently, we play with fire when we
assume an easy crossover of Fourteenth Amendment maxims
pronounced in cases decided in such other contexts.55
The Hopwood majority rejected Justice Powell's analysis in Bakke.
First, the panel held that no consideration could ever be given to race
in any context, except for remedial purposes. Second, by stating that
race is no more relevant than "physical size or blood type," and that
the consideration of race achieves nothing other than "a student body
that looks different," the Fifth Circuit rejected out-of-hand the
possibility (recognized by Justice Powell) that there are some life
experiences relevant to professional study that are uniquely accessible
to - and perhaps inescapable by - members of a particular race. In
other words, the panel rejected the possibility that there are relevant
aspects of a person's life experience that correlate with race, but not
necessarily with other factors, such as geography, class, cultural
advantage, or economic status. We know that to be the case. It has
become painfully clear, for example, that young black men are
disproportionately hassled by the police, disproportionately know
others who have had that experience, and disproportionately fear
having that experience themselves. 56 Similarly, we know that only
55 Id. at 965 n.21 (Wiener, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
56 See CHRISTINE Eim, MATTHEw R DUROSE & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT
NJC 234599: CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2008, at 1 (Oct. 2011),
https/www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp08.pdf (reporting that black male drivers are
stopped at about the same rate as others, but are three times as likely to be searched
incident to stop); see also JAMES FORMAN,JR., LOCKING UP OUR OwN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN BLACK AMERICA 188-94 (2017) (discussing pretextual police stops in African-American
community); ROBERT F. KENNEDY HUMAN RIGHTS GLOB. JUSTICE CLINIC ET AL., EXCESSIVE USE
OF FORCE BY THE POLICE AGAINST BLACK AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES 4-5 (Feb. 12,
2016), http//rfkhumanrights.org/media/filer-public/7d/84/7d8409c1-588f-4163-b552-
If6428e685db/iachr thematicjhearing-submission - excessive use of forcejbypolice
against black americans.pdf (concluding that African Americans face disproportionate
force used by police); Rod K. Brunson & Jody Miller, Young Black Men and Urban Policing
in the United States, 46 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 613, 634-37 (2005) (focusing on the
disproportionate harassment by police of young black men); Robert D. Crutchfield et al.,
Racial Disparities in Early Criminal Justice Involvement, 1 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 218, 229-31
(2009) (finding that young black men are more likely to have police contacts and arrests);
Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department's "Stop-and-
Frisk" Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. AsS'N 813, 821-22
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Hispanic people have the experience of being stopped for "driving
while Hispanic."5 7 We would prefer to live in a world in which these
correlations do not exist, but that is not the world in which we do live.
Moreover, by asserting that race is no more relevant to the educational
experience than "physical size or blood type," and that race-conscious
admissions policies achieve nothing other than "a student body that
looks different," the panel implicitly rejected the validity of Justice
Powell's critical insights about the nature of professional education.
Certainly, the court gave no hint of having thought about the ways in
which legal education helps to develop "that enlargement and
correction of perspective, that critical and inclusive view of reality,
that is based on the disciplined exercise of skills which the layman is
not given the opportunity to acquire."5 3
Although the Supreme Court denied review in Hopwood, the Fifth
Circuit's decision nonetheless provided a new narrative and gave the
issue a new urgency, as university administrators and others wondered
about the continued relevance of the always-fragile Bakke holding.
II. GRUTTER, GRATZ, AND THE MISSION OF LEGAL EDUCATION
In 2003, the Supreme Court finally revisited the subject of racial and
ethnic diversity in higher education admissions. It did so in two cases
involving the University of Michigan: Grutter v. Bollinger59 and Gratz
v. Bollinger.60 As in Hopwood, the Grutter plaintiffs alleged that the law
school's consideration of race "as a factor" in admissions decisions
violated their rights to the equal protection of the laws. In Grutter, five
(2007) (concluding that African-Americans and Hispanics were more likely to be stopped).
Studies with respect to English and Welsh policing patterns show similar results. See Ben
Bowling & Coretta Phillips, Disproportionate and Discriminatory: Reviewing the Evidence on
Police Stop and Search, 70 MOD. L. REv. 936, 958-61 (2007) (finding that black people in
England and Wales are six times more likely to be searched).
5 See, e.g., Angela Stuesse et al., Driving While Latino, HUFFPOST (Sept. 30,
2016, 11:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/driving-while-latino us_
57ed6ce4e4b07f20daal052f (explaining how section 287(g) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act has "created a gauntlet of immigrant policing that stretches across the
country and operates through the intensified surveillance of immigrants"); Katherine
Webber, Racial Profiling? Police Stopped Evangelical Pastor "For Looking Like a Drug
Dealer," CHRISTIAN POST (June 18, 2014), https://www.christianpost.com/news/racial-
profiling-police-stopped-evangelical-hispanic-pastor-for-looking-like-a-drug-dealer-
121722 (police allegedly admitted stopping Christian pastor because his appearance
fit a profile).
58 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 2, at 211.
59 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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members of the Court, speaking through Justice O'Connor, 61 upheld
the constitutionality of the law school admissions program,
substantially adopting Justice Powell's reasoning in Bakke and
reaffirming that a public university may have a compelling interest in
the racial and ethnic diversity of its student body.62 Justice O'Connor
emphasized that context matters when courts are asked to evaluate the
constitutionality of race-conscious decision-making:
Context matters when reviewing race-based governmental
action under the Equal Protection Clause . . . . [W]e [have]
made clear that strict scrutiny must take "'relevant differences'
into account." Indeed, . . . that is its "fundamental purpose."
Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable,
and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for
carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of the
reasons advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the
use of race in that particular context.63
In other words, Justice O'Connor recognized that race-consciousness
in university admissions may present different issues, serve different
purposes, and lead to different legal conclusions than would race-
consciousness in other contexts. Justice O'Connor went on to
conclude that the law school's consideration of race as one factor in an
individualized evaluation process satisfied constitutional
61 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens joined in Justice O'Connor's
opinion in its entirety. Justices Scalia and Thomas technically joined it in part, but
essentially dissented, joining Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. See
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 374-
78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
62 In addition to confirming the correctness of Justice Powell's analysis, the Court
imposed a "sunset" provision: "We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary . . . ." Id. at 343. Justice Ginsburg, in a
concurring opinion joined by Justice Breyer, agreed "that race-conscious programs
'must have a logical end point,"' but she pointed out the difficulty of predicting an
appropriate end date, given the continued persistence of racial discrimination. See id.
at 344-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
63 Id. at 327 (citations omitted). Justice O'Connor's emphasis on context also
permitted her to distinguish other post-Bakke cases in which the Court seemed to
suggest that "the only governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is
remedying past discrimination." Id. at 328. Building on Justice Powell's understanding
of the special nature of higher education, Justice O'Connor held that "[tihe Law
School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational
mission is one to which we defer." Id. Further, Justice O'Connor explained, "Our
scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for taking into
account complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the
expertise of the university." Id.
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requirements. 64 In Gratz, which was decided the same day, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and five other Justices
(including Justice O'Connor),65 struck down Michigan's
undergraduate admissions program, which simply awarded "bonus
points" to minority candidates. 66 Taken together, the "split double-
header" (as Justice Scalia referred to the two decisions)67 reaffirms the
distinction drawn by Justice Powell between legitimate and illegitimate
considerations of race, based on the presence or absence of an
64 See id. at 334.
65 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Gratz. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 247. Justice O'Connor wrote
separately to emphasize the factual differences between Michigan's two race-conscious
admissions policies. See id. at 276-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also
wrote separately, expressing the view that any consideration of race is categorically
prohibited. See id. at 281 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Breyer concurred only in
the judgment. Id. at 281 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Stevens thought that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. Id. at 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Justice
Souter also thought that they lacked standing, he thought that they would lose in any
event because the admissions program was constitutional. See id. at 291, 296 (Souter,
J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also dissented. Among other things, she rejected the
view that benign and malevolent considerations of race should be evaluated under the
same standard of review. See id. at 302 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (quoting United
States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966)).
66 The unsuccessful applicants also argued that racial diversity is "too open-ended,
ill-defined, and indefinite to constitute a compelling interest capable of supporting
narrowly-tailored means." Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268. The Gratz Court rejected that
argument, relying on its decision in Grutter for the proposition that university race-
conscious admissions programs will be upheld if the university can show that its "use
of race in its . .. admissions program employs 'narrowly tailored measures that further
compelling government interests."' Id. at 268-70. But the Gratz Court found that the
required showing had not been made with respect to the undergraduate admissions
program, which "automatically distribute[d] 20 points, or one-fifth of the [1001 points
needed to guarantee admission, to every single 'underrepresented minority' applicant
solely because of race . . . ." Id. at 270. The Court rejected the University's argument
that the constitutionality of its policy should be upheld because the sheer volume of
undergraduate applications made individualized assessments administratively
impracticable:
[T]he fact that the implementation of a program capable of providing
individualized consideration might present administrative challenges does
not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system. Nothing in
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke signaled that a university may employ
whatever means it desires to achieve the stated goal of diversity without
regard to the limits imposed by our strict scrutiny analysis.
Id. at 275 (citation omitted).
67 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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individualized evaluation of applicants. As justice O'Connor said in
her concurring opinion in Gratz:
Unlike the law school admissions policy the Court upholds
today in [Grutterl, the procedures employed by the . . . Office
of Undergraduate Admissions do not provide for a meaningful
individualized review of applicants. The law school considers
the various diversity qualifications of each applicant, including
race, on a case-by-case basis. By contrast, the Office of
Undergraduate Admissions relies on the selection index to
assign every underrepresented minority applicant the same,
automatic 20-point bonus without consideration of the
particular background, experiences, or qualities of each
individual applicant. And this mechanized selection index
score, by and large, automatically determines the admissions
decision for each applicant. 68
Notwithstanding her important insight in Grutter concerning the
significance of context (which allowed her to distinguish public higher
education from other aspects of the public sector), justice O'Connor
opted not to go a step further and consider the specific context
involved in Grutter at a more granular level. Whereas Justice Powell
had discussed the special concerns and demands of professional
education, focusing on the task of helping students to develop the
qualities of judgment and imagination necessary for effective
professional practice, Justice O'Connor did not dwell on the fact that
the Grutter case involved professional education. She did not discuss
the professional work that lawyers and judges do, the kind of
educational program that might be appropriate for preparing students
to do that work, or the specific contribution that the insights of a
diverse student body might make to such an educational program. 69
68 Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276-77 (citations omitted).
69 Justice O'Connor did acknowledge the Law School's argument about the
importance of student interaction: "The hallmark of that policy is its focus on
academic ability coupled with a flexible assessment of applicants' talents, experiences,
and potential 'to contribute to the learning of those around them."' Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 315. But the point remains undeveloped, perhaps because the argument was taken
to be a generic argument about education in general, rather than an argument peculiar
to legal education. Similarly, Justice O'Connor notes that the Law School's "policy
aspires to 'achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone's
education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts."' Id. She
also notes that the Law School "recognizes 'many possible bases for diversity
admissions,'" but "reaffirm[s] [its] longstanding commitment" to "racial and ethnic
diversity," and seeks to enroll "a 'critical mass' of [underrepresented] minority
[Vol. 51:11051128
The Power of Imagination
By painting with a broad brush, Justice O'Connor was able (aided by
the Chief Justice's analysis in Gratz) to formulate a categorical rule for
evaluating race-conscious admissions programs throughout higher
education. From the viewpoint of efficient judicial decision-making,
that may have been a sensible choice, as it permitted the Court to
reach broadly and settle the nettlesome problem of race-consciousness
for all of higher education. Moreover, there was much evidence to
show that the educational benefits of diversity were felt throughout
higher education. 70  Nonetheless, higher education clearly
encompasses a broad and diverse range of institutions, activities, and
endeavors,7 ' and arguments for the importance of diversity may be
stronger - or at least different - in some sectors than in others. By
focusing on higher education as a whole, justice O'Connor may have
maximized the reach of Grutter, but undercut the force of her insight
concerning the centrality of context.
Justice O'Connor could have emphasized the special importance of
diversity in preparing men and women for careers as lawyers and
judges. She did mention that "underrepresented minority students"
are, "[bly virtue of our Nation's struggle with racial inequality," likely
"to have [had] experiences of particular importance to the Law
students." Id. at 316 (third alteration in original). According to the Law School,
"critical mass" is important because "racial stereotypes lose their force because
nonminority students learn there is no 'minority viewpoint,' but rather a variety of
viewpoints among minority students." Id. at 319-20. Finally, Justice O'Connor states,
"The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its
educational mission is one to which we defer." Id. at 328. But such deference is not
special to law schools; the Court pays the same deference to similar academic
judgments made by other units of higher education, so long as those units implement
their judgments in a manner that "providels] for a meaningful individualized review
of applicants." Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276.
70 See Adam D. Galinsky et al., Maximizing the Gains and Minimizing the Pains of
Diversity: A Policy Perspective, 10 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. Sa. 742, 743-44 (2015)
(describing how personal experiences with diversity increase creativity); see, e.g.,
Patricia Y. Gurin et al., Diversity and Higher Education: Theory and Impact on
Educational Outcomes, 72 HARV. EDUc. REV. 330, 358-59 (2002) (discussing how
diversity improved learning and democracy outcomes); Patricia Y. Gurin et al., How
Does Racial/Ethnic Diversity Promote Education?, 27 W.J. BLACK STUD. 20, 24-30 (2003)
(discussing positive outcomes because of diversity and use of studies in litigation).
71 The point needs little or no explanation, but one cannot help but think in this
connection of Gilbert Ryle's classic illustration of a category mistake: the foreign
visitor who comes to Oxford or Cambridge, to see the university, is shown the various
colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments, and administrative
offices, and then asks, "b]ut where is the University?," as if the university were
something in addition to its parts. See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 6 (2009);
see also STEFAN COLLINI, WHAT ARE UNIVERSITIES FOR? 3-19 (2012) (describing the wide
variety of "universities").
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School's mission" 72 - and she noted that "attaining a diverse student
body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission"73
- but she did not elaborate further. She did not call attention to the
specific kinds of topics that are discussed in law school classrooms or
the importance to those discussions of being able to draw upon a
variety of perspectives. And while she emphasized the importance of
diversity to citizen formation in a multicultural society - and on the
important leadership roles played by elite lawyers and graduates of
other divisions of elite institutions'4 - she made no argument based
directly on the demands of the professional work that most lawyers
and judges actually do, on how diversity in legal education might
relate to that work, or on how diversity might contribute to the way in
which lawyers and judges are educated.'5 While Justice Powell focused
on the process whereby professionals are prepared "to render with
72 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 338.
73 Id. at 329.
74 In this sense, Justice O'Connor moved beyond the analysis contained in justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke, which focused primarily on the educational benefits of
diversity in higher education. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 15, at 60 ("The Grutter
opinion ... takes the Court a step further, justifying affirmative action for a purpose
Justice Powell had not mentioned. The inclusion of substantial numbers of minority
students in the universities is a matter of compelling importance, the Court says,
because the universities are gateways to leadership in American institutions.").
75 In addition, Justice O'Connor's discussion of elite institutions falls far short of
covering the field for at least two reasons: achieving diversity is not a concern only of
elite colleges and law schools, and, to the extent that diversity is relevant to the
training of men and women who will become judges, it is important to recognize that
many (perhaps most) judges are not graduates of elite law schools. For example, a
recent study shows that few graduates of elite law schools become state supreme court
justices, regardless of the method used to select judges in a particular jurisdiction. See,
e.g., GREG GOELZH-AUSER, CHOOSING STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: MERIT SELECTION
AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 80 (2016) ("Substantively, the
probability of seating a state supreme court] justice who attended an elite law school
decreases from 18 percent . . . under merit selection to 12 percent . . . under election,
a change of -6 percent . . . . The probability of seating a justice who attended an elite
law school decreases from 22 percent . .. under appointment to 12 percent . .. under
election, a change of 10 percent .... ). The situation in state trial and appellate courts
is undoubtedly similar. A review of the published biographies of the judges of the
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, for example, shows that only 23 (or 5.99%) of
the 384 circuit court judges are graduates of the top 14 law schools as listed in the
2017 US NEWS & WORLD REPORT law school rankings. Of those 23 judges, 5 are
graduates of the University of Chicago Law School and 9 are graduates of
Northwestern University School of Law, both of which are located in Cook County.
See SULLIVAN'SJUDICIAL PROFILES: THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL DIRECTORY, 2017-18 (2017); see
also Best Law Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., https://www.usnews.com/best-
graduate-schools/top-law-schools/law-rankings (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
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understanding their vital service to humanity,"7 6 Justice O'Connor
seemed most concerned with the instrumental social value of having
some degree of diversity within the ranks of the nation's "elite,"
including the elite bar. Indeed, to the extent that Justice O'Connor
focuses on any context more specific than that of higher education
generally, it is not so much on professional or legal education, but on
elite education. Elite institutions are important, in her view, because
they are the training ground for those who are or will become the
nation's elite.
Justice O'Connor's approach diverges from Justice Powell's analysis
in Bakke, where he not only took seriously the professional work that
lawyers and physicians actually do, but seemed to suggest that
diversity might have special salience in professional education.7 7 Like
Justice Powell, Justice O'Connor is interested in what goes on in
university classrooms, but more so, perhaps, in what goes on in their
placement offices:
These benefits [of diversity] are substantial. As the District
Court emphasized, the Law School's admissions policy
promotes "cross-racial understanding," helps to break down
racial stereotypes, and "enables [students] to better
understand persons of different races." These benefits are
"important and laudable," because "classroom discussion is
livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and
interesting" when the students have "the greatest possible
variety of backgrounds."
[Niumerous studies show that student body diversity
promotes learning outcomes, and "better prepares students for
an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better
prepares them as professionals."
These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's
increasingly global marketplace can only be developed
through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas,
and viewpoints.
[In addition,] a "highly qualified, racially diverse officer
corps . . . is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its
princi[pal] mission to provide national security." .. . At
76 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978).
77 See id. at 313-14.
2018] 1131
University of California, Davis
present, "the military cannot achieve an officer corps that is
both highly qualified and racially diverse unless the service
academies and the ROTC used limited race-conscious
recruiting and admissions policies." ... We agree that "[ilt
requires only a small step from this analysis to conclude that
our country's other most selective institutions must remain
both diverse and selective."
We have repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance
of preparing students for work and citizenship, describing
education as pivotal to "sustaining our political and cultural
heritage" with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of
society . . . . Effective participation by members of all racial
and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if
the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.
Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools,
represent the training ground for a large number of our
Nation's leaders. Individuals with law degrees occupy roughly
half the state governorships, more than half the seats in the
United States Senate, and more than a third of the seats in the
United States House of Representatives. The pattern is even
more striking when it comes to highly selective law schools. A
handful of these schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United
States Senators, 74 United States Courts of Appeals judges, and
nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States District Court
judges.
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes
of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race
and ethnicity . . . . Access to legal education (and thus the
legal profession) must be inclusive of talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity, so that all members of
our heterogeneous society may participate in the educational
institutions that provide the training and education necessary
to succeed in America. 78
These are wise observations, and none of them is wrong. Promoting
upward mobility is a time-honored function of higher education, 79 and
78 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-33 (third and seventh alterations in original) (citations
omitted).
79 See, e.g., Alfred S. Konefsky & Barry Sullivan, In This, the Winter of Our
Discontent: Legal Practice, Legal Education, and the Culture of Distrust, 62 BueF. L. REv.
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a democratic society cannot flourish if members of some groups feel
unfairly excluded from the path to leadership and success that runs
through elite institutions of higher learning.80 But very few students of
any race or ethnicity will gain entry to elite universities,8 ' and even
fewer will gain admission to elite law schools. Fewer still will have the
opportunity to become Senators or federal judges. While many
national leaders have attended law school, the cultivation of national
leaders is not the principal mission of law schools. The main business'
of law schools is to educate lawyers and judges, and by far the largest
number of students who gain admission to any law school will become
practicing lawyers in public and private contexts and state court
judges. Presumably, a law school's commitment to diversity will help
make students more effective leaders and citizens, as Justice O'Connor
suggests, but will it contribute to their formation as legal
professionals? Will it help make them better lawyers and judges? The
answer to that question is clear, but Justice O'Connor's opinion does
little, if anything, to answer it. Because she makes little mention of
what lawyers and judges do in practice, she draws no connection
between the need for diversity in legal education and the actual project
of preparing lawyers and judges to do what they will do in practice.
By speaking so little about the immediate context, Justice O'Connor
allowed the dissenters to offer their own accounts of legal education
and legal practice - accounts that are narrow and mechanical and
leave no room for any special argument for diversity based on the
demands of the work that lawyers and judges do in our democratic
society. In that sense, Justice O'Connor's approach represents a missed
opportunity to talk about what it means to be a lawyer, about what it
means to be a judge, and about the role of diversity in preparing
students for those callings.
659, 663 (2014) (asserting this in the context of legal education).
80 See, e.g., Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical Narratives and Social
Science Evidence: Reading the' "Record" in the Virginia Military Institute Case, 5 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 189, 271 (1996) ("Judge Kiser heard days of testimony and
found a great many facts, but he failed to ask why VMI continued to refuse to admit
women or why admitting women would destroy VMI - why was this litigation, for
VMI, 'nothing short of a life-and-death confrontation?"').
s For example, Harvard College admits about one in twenty applicants. See Anna
Cowenhoven, Harvard College Admits 2,056 to Class of '21, HARV. GAZETTE (Mar. 30,
2017), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/03/2056-applicants-were-invited-
today-to-join-harvard-colleges-class-of-2021. But see EDWARD LUCE, THE RETREAT OF
WESTERN LIBERALISM 44 (2017) ("About a third of legacy applicants ... are accepted
into Harvard.").
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Justice Scalia begins his dissent 82 by noting his agreement with Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion.83 He also endorses Justice
Thomas's observation that "the allegedly 'compelling state interest' at
issue here is not the incremental 'educational benefit' that emanates
from the fabled 'critical mass' of minority students, but rather
Michigan's interest in maintaining a 'prestige' law school whose
normal admissions standards disproportionately exclude blacks and
other minorities." 84 According to Justice Scalia, "[i]f that is a
compelling state interest, everything is."85 From the beginning, then,
Justice Scalia focuses on the fact that this is a case about legal
education - a subject with which he is familiar and about which he
believes that he can write with authority.86 Justice Scalia knows legal
education, and he knows that legal education has no need for
diversity. In his view of legal education, there is no conceivable
82 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Like Justice Thomas, see id. at 350-51 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), Justice Scalia concurs in part in the majority's opinion for the
reasons stated by justice Thomas: first, they agree with the majority "insofar as its
decision, which approves of only one racial classification, confirms that further use of
race in admissions is unlawful," and, second, they agree with the majority insofar as it
holds "that racial discrimination in higher education admissions will be illegal in 25
years." Id. Of course, they "respectfully dissent from the remainder of the Court's
opinion and the judgment ... because [they] believe that the Law School's current use
of race [is unconstitutional]." Id. at 351.
83 Id. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
states: "As [the Chief Justice] demonstrates, the ... Law School's mystical 'critical
mass' justification for its discrimination by race challenges even the most gullible
mind. The admissions statistics show it to be a sham to cover a scheme of racially
proportionate admissions." Id.
84 Id. at 347.
85 Id.
86 Justice Scalia taught at the University of Virginia Law School from 1967 to 1971
and at the University of Chicago Law School from 1977 to 1982. See JOAN BISKUPIC,
AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF ANTONIN SCALIA 37-38, 65-79
(2009); Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/0214/us/antonin-scalia-
death.html; see also Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: "In Order to Get Beyond
Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race," 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 147 ("As you
know, every panel needs an anti-hero, and I fill that role on this one. I have grave
doubts about where we are going in affirmative action, and in equal protection
generally. I frankly find this area an embarrassment to teach. Here, as in some other
fields of constitutional law, it is increasingly difficult to pretend to one's students that
the decisions of the Supreme Court are tied together by threads of logic and analysis
- as opposed to what seems to be the fact that the decisions of each of the Justices ...
are tied together by threads of social preference and predisposition. Frankly, I don't
have it in me to play the game of distinguishing and reconciling the cases in this
utterly confused field.").
1134 [Vol. 51:1105
The Power of Imagination
educational purpose to be served by a race-conscious admissions
program.87 To put the matter in terms that he has used elsewhere: any
contrary understanding is simply the product of a wrong-headed "law-
profession culture"88 or further evidence of an out-of-touch
"professoriate." 89 In any event, Justice Scalia's opinion fairly drips with
sarcasm.
In the absence of any sustained narrative by Justice O'Connor
concerning the intrinsic purpose of legal education - or how
diversity might relate to that purpose in a tangible and immediate way
- Justice Scalia proceeds to present his own brief account. Thus, he
dismisses the idea that future lawyers and judges could receive any
"educational benefit" from being part of a diverse student body: "This
is not, of course, an 'educational benefit' on which students will be
graded on their law school transcript (Works and Plays Well with
Others: B+) or tested by the bar examiners (Q: Describe in 500 words
or less your cross-racial understanding)."9 o These are "lessons in life,"
according to Justice Scalia, "generic lessons in socialization and good
citizenship" that "cannot be 'taught' in the usual sense" and are
learned by "people three feet shorter and 20 years younger than the
full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in
institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school
kindergartens. If properly considered an 'educational benefit' at all, it
is surely not one that is uniquely relevant to law school or uniquely
'teachable' in a formal educational setting."9 '
This is a grim view of a dull and dismal place. This is a' law school
without the thrill of intellectual discovery, the satisfaction of
professional development, or the confidence gained through the
acquisition of professional judgment and imagination. There is no
seminar room in which one student's insightful intervention has
moved the discussion to a new level, altering forever the way in which
everyone in the room (including the teacher) will think about stock
fraud or fiduciary duties or hate speech or sexual harassment. There is
no classroom in which the class is for the moment mesmerized by the
intervention of one student who tells what it was actually like when he
87 Thus, according to Justice Scalia, the benefits to be achieved through
"government discrimination on the basis of race" are not "educational benefit[s]." See
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347, 349.
88 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S.
742 (2010) (No. 08-1521).
90 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 347.
91 Id. at 347-48.
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or a brother or a cousin or a friend was stopped and questioned by the
police for no obvious, legitimate reason. This is a law school in which
a student's willingness to learn from others ended at puberty, if not in
kindergarten.
Justice Scalia's statements seem to suggest that the only "educational
benefits" that count are those that end in grades on a transcript or lead
to success on the bar exam. On this view, professional formation
ought not to be a concern for either the law student or the law
school.92 It is surprising, to say the least, that these are the
observations of a distinguished judge and former law teacher. The first
observation - concerning the lack of educational value of anything
that cannot be tested - sounds more like that of an incurious student
who sees no point in learning anything that will not be on the final
exam, while the second seems to suggest that post-primary education
consists exclusively of learning technical skills and taking on technical
information.93 But that is an impoverished view of legal education that
necessarily follows from an impoverished view of lawyering and
judging.
Similarly, Justice Thomas observes that, "The majority upholds the
Law School's racial discrimination not by interpreting the people's
Constitution, but by responding to a faddish slogan of the
cognoscenti." 94 The "faddish slogan" is "diversity,"9 5 which, according
to Justice Thomas, is nothing but an "aesthetic" concern:
92 If these were appropriate measurements, it would be difficult to justify
experiential learning as a part of legal education. Simulations and clinical experiences
obviously cannot be graded in the same way as doctrinal classes, and the bar
examiners have not yet devised a method for testing the relevant skills on the bar
exam.
93 Justice Scalia's account of legal education might profitably be compared to the
view of education taken by Philip Jackson, who wrote: "This brings us to what might
be called education's bottom line, which is the conclusion that education, au fond, is a
moral enterprise. It is so because it aims at improvement. It seeks to make everyone it
touches, teachers as well as students, better than they are now. Viewed globally, it
tries to leave the world a better place. Its task is endless for the simple reason that
each new generation of humans needs to be educated. But it is also endless because
each new generation is free to build on, to 'rectify and expand,' as Dewey might put it,
the accomplishments of generations past." PHILIP W. JACKSON, WHAT Is EDUCATION?
92-93 (2012). But see Barry Sullivan & Ellen S. Podgor, Respect, Responsibility, and the
Virtue of Introspection: An Essay on Professionalism in the Law School Environment, 15
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 117, 119-20 (2001) (discussing the need for
professional formation as part of legal education).
94 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Thomas saw that "slogan" as a gesture of paternalism: "Like [Frederick]
Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the
meddling of university administrators." Id. If that were all that were at stake, Justice
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"[D]iversity," for all of its devotees, is more a fashionable
catchphrase than it is a useful term, especially when
something as serious as racial discrimination is at issue.
Because the Equal Protection Clause renders the color of one's
skin constitutionally irrelevant to the Law School's mission, I
refer to the Law School's interest as an "aesthetic." That is, the
Law School wants to have a certain appearance, from the
shape of the desks and tables in its classrooms to the color of
the students sitting at them.96
Like the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood, Justice Thomas submits that the
only significance of ethnic and racial diversity is aesthetic - taking
diversity into account results in nothing other than a class that "looks
different." Or, as the Hopwood court put it, race is no more relevant
than "physical size or blood type." But that seems to ignore what
preparation for law practice requires, as well as what goes on in law
school classrooms at their best - an educational process driven by the
candid but respectful exchange of ideas by persons of various
perspectives about some of the most difficult, important, and
potentially divisive issues that face our society. It also ignores the fact
that persons of different races may have substantially different
experiences because of race, regardless of other variables such as
wealth, educational level, or social class, 97 and the further fact that
such experiences are not only relevant, but central, to the study of law.
Given the importance of law, lawyers, and judges in our society, the
"assembling of a law school class" is not quite as "trivial" an exercise
as Justice Thomas suggests.98
Thomas's point would have some traction; but more is at stake, namely, the mix of
experiences, perspectives, and voices necessary to providing an optimal educational
experience for all students. See id. at 329-33.
95 Id. at 350.
96 Id. at 354 n.3; see also id. at 355 ("The Law School's argument, as facile as it is,
can only be understood in one way: Classroom aesthetics yields educational benefits,
racially discriminatory admissions policies are required to achieve the right racial mix,
and therefore the policies are required to achieve the educational benefits. It is the
educational benefits that are the end, or allegedly compelling state interest, not
'diversity."' (first emphasis added)).
97 See, e.g., Scott Horsley, Obama Walks Fine Line on Race and Policing, NPR (July
13, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/07/13/485855670/obama-talks-about-race-and-
police-again (discussing the significance of race, noting that President Obama's words
on the subject of race and the police are not simply the words of an experienced
policymaker, but those of "a man who could say, as Dallas Police Chief David Brown
did this week, 'I've been black a long time."').
98 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 357 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). Justice Thomas laments the fact that "the entire [student selection]
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Justice Thomas thinks that Michigan has no compelling interest in
having a law school at all, let alone an elite law school, and certainly
not a diverse, elite law school. 99 Whatever "marginal improvements in
legal education" might result from diversity, Justice Thomas suggests,
those improvements "do not qualify as a compelling state interest."100
Moreover, according to Justice Thomas, the crux of the problem is
that the University of Michigan wants to have an "aesthetic" student
body without sacrificing its status as an elite educational institution:
"The Law School should be forced to choose between its classroom
aesthetic and its exclusionary admissions system - it cannot have it
both ways."1o' But that suggestion is wide of the mark. The majority
rightly refuses to accept the legitimacy or necessity of that choice
because the university believes that the very excellence of professional
education depends on diversity.
process is poisoned by numerous exceptions to 'merit,"' including so-called "legacy"
preferences, which give an advantage in the admissions process to children of alumni.
Id. at 368. In that regard, he questions the motives of "the elites" who have supported
the University of Michigan: "Were this Court to have the courage to forbid the use of
racial discrimination in admissions, legacy preferences (and similar practices) might
quickly become less popular - a possibility not lost, I am certain, on the elites .... "
Id. at 368 n.10.
99 See id. at 357-58. Indeed, Justice Thomas contends that the majority did not
"define with precision the interest being asserted by the Law School before
determining whether that interest is so compelling as to justify racial discrimination."
Id. at 354. Further, "[a] close reading of the Court's opinion reveals that all of its legal
work is done through one conclusory statement: The Law School has a 'compelling
interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse student body.' No serious
effort is made to explain how these benefits fit with the state interests.the Court has
recognized (or rejected) as compelling . . . or to place any theoretical constraints on an
enterprising court's desire to discover still more justifications for racial
discrimination." Id. at 356 (citation omitted). He later contrasts the deference that the
Grutter majority gives to Michigan's judgments about the "educational benefits of a
diverse student body" with the Court's alleged disregard for the Virginia Military
Institute's analogous judgments in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). He
writes: "Apparently where the status quo being defended is that of the elite
establishment - here the Law School - rather than a less fashionable Southern
military institution, the Court will defer without serious inquiry and without regard to
the applicable legal standard." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 366 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
1oo Grutter, 539 U.S. at 357.
101 Id. at 361; see also id. at 355-56 ("The Law School adamantly disclaims any race-
neutral alternative that would reduce 'academic selectivity,' which would in turn
,require the Law School to become a very different institution, and to sacrifice a core
part of its academic mission.' . . . [Tihe Law School seeks to improve marginally the
education it offers without sacrificing too much of its exclusivity and elite status.")
(citation omitted).
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But Justice Thomas's quarrel is as much with Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke as with the majority's opinion in Grutter:
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and the Court's decision
today rest on the fundamentally flawed proposition that racial
discrimination can be contextualized so that a goal, such as
classroom aesthetics, can be compelling in one context but not
in another. This "we know it when we see it" approach to
evaluating state interests is not capable of judicial application.
Today, the Court insists on radically expanding the range of
permissible uses of race to something as trivial (by
comparison) as the assembling of a law school class.1 02
The Scalia and Thomas dissents simply refuse to take seriously the
possibility that racial or ethnic diversity has anything to contribute to
the professional formation of lawyers and judges. Indeed, they refuse
to take seriously the possibility that diversity of any kind has anything
to contribute to any aspect of university education. Once Justice Scalia
pronounces that any lesson to be learned from diversity is one that
should have been learned in kindergarten and Justice Thomas asserts
that it is a mere "aesthetic," like the shape and size of the desks and
tables in the classroom, the game is up. There is no point in going
further.
III. IMAGINATION AND JUDGMENT: WHAT LAWYERS AND JUDGES Do
As Justice O'Connor pointed out in Grutter, there is abundant social
science evidence to substantiate the importance of diversity in higher
education.1 03 That is not surprising. Perhaps the greatest challenge we
face, as Carlos Nino has said, is "the difficulty each of us has in
representing vividly the situations and interests of people very
different from ourselves." 0 4 To do so requires the most intense and
102 Id. at 357.
103 Id. at 330.
104 OWEN Fiss, PILLARS OF JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND THE LIBERAL TRADITION 142 (2017)
(quoting Carlos Nino); see also Michael Kaufman, Social justice and the American Law
School Today: Since We Are Made for Love, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1187, 1222 (2017)
("Diverse individuals in a group create a higher level of collective intelligence than
groups comprised even of higher achieving individuals .... A diverse learning
environment also builds the critical cognitive capacity to take another person's
perspective. The ability to appreciate, understand, and respect the thoughts, feelings,
and intentions of people who seem to be different is particularly challenging. But the
pattern of confronting and overcoming the challenge of accommodating different
perspectives is the key to learning. The experience enables the student to embrace
rather than to fear difference." (footnotes omitted)). Some neuroscience research
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concentrated act of imagination. Indeed, "understanding one another
involves [nothing less than] thinking of oneself as another."1 0 This
moral imperative is also a necessity of social and political life. The
need to understand those whose "situations and interests" are different
from our own is particularly acute in a democratic society because
democracy depends on trust among strangers and on a common
recognition that, whatever our differences may be, "[wle are all awash
in each other's lives."10 6 No less important, of course, is the need to
appreciate the limitations of our own perspectives. 107
If one of the purposes of higher education is to help develop
individuals as human beings and citizens, it follows that institutions of
among college-age students suggests that the ability to learn actually grows by virtue
of encounters with diverse perspectives. See, e.g., Nicholas A. Bowman, College
Diversity Experiences and Cognitive Development: A Meta-Analysis, 80 REv. EDUc. RES. 4
(2010), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.3102/0034654309352495 (describing
cognitive growth as a result of diversity experiences).
105 TED COHEN, THINKING OF OTHERS: ON THE TALENT FOR METAPHOR 17 (2008); see
also id. at 63 ("IBleing human requires knowing what it is to be human, and that
requires the intimate recognition of other human beings.").
106 ALLEN, supra note 9, at xxii. As Danielle Allen has pointed out, "the hard [and
often unacknowledged] truth of democracy is that some citizens are always giving
things up for others. Only vigorous forms of citizenship can give a polity the resources
to deal with the inevitable problem of sacrifice." Id. at 29. Those resources are found
not just in structures of government, but also in the character and the practices of the
people. The stability of a democratic society therefore depends on its ability "to
develop criteria for distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate forms of sacrifice, and
also to outline a form of citizenship that helps citizens generate trust enough among
themselves to manage sacrifice." Id.; see also William Cronon, "Only Connect. . .": The
Goals of a Liberal Education, 67 AM. SCHOLAR 73, 78 (Autumn 1998) ("Education for
human freedom is also education for human community. The two cannot exist
without each other. Each of the qualities I have described is a craft or a skill or a way
of being in the world that frees us to act with greater knowledge or power. But each of
these qualities also makes us ever more aware of the connections we have with other
people and the rest of creation, and so they remind us of the obligations we have to
use our knowledge and power responsibly. If I am right that all these qualities are
finally about connecting, then we need to confront one further paradox about liberal
education. In the act of making us free, it also binds us to the communities that gave
us our freedom in the first place . . . . In the end, it turns out that liberty is not about
thinking or saying or doing whatever we want. It is about exercising our freedom in
such a way as to make a difference in the world and make a difference for more than
just ourselves.").
107 See, e.g., Thomas S. Morawetz, The Epistemology of Judging: Wittgenstein and
Deliberative Practices, 3 CANADIAN J.L. &JURIS. 35, 57 (1990) ("The issue is rather that
the ways in which persons fit psychological, economic, political, social experiences
together, the ways in which they make sense of their own lives and the lives of others,
differ significantly and . . . hard questions of decision making fall prey to that
diversity.").
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higher education should be concerned with maximizing their students'
exposure to a variety of perspectives, and with making sure that those
perspectives are thoroughly investigated, critically examined, and
rigorously discussed.108 In that sense, diversity is critical to the life of
the modern American university. But diversity is particularly
important to the professional education of lawyers and judges, and
that is because of the nature of law and what lawyers and judges do.
Because of the work that they do, judges are constantly challenged to
understand and appreciate aspects of human life quite different from
their own, and legal education is challenged to provide them with a
basis for doing so.
To be sure, we yearn for a world in which law is certain and
transparent and unencumbered by the need for interpretation. While
that is not our world, it seems to give us comfort to think that it is. In
judicial confirmation hearings, for example, Supreme Court nominees
are regularly expected to affirm, as if they were reciting from the
catechism, that judging involves "law all the way down" or that the
judge's role is nothing more than "calling balls and strikes." 0 9 In a
weak sense, judging does involve "law all the way down," but only if
one means that notwithstanding the inherent indeterminacy of law
and the consequent need for the exercise of judgment in legal decision
making, the solutions to legal problems must be drawn from the
recognized sources of law, using recognized methodologies of
108 Legal education must also include tools for interpreting a wide variety of
information, including social science data. See Konefsky & Sullivan, supra note 79, at
706-08; see also Bandes, Empathetic Judging, supra note 28, at 145-46 (discussing
Justice Kennedy's failure to seek accurate information in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S.
124 (2007)).
109 See, e.g., The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the judiciary, 111th Cong. 8,
103 (2010) (Testimony of Elena Kagan); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of
John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 203 (2005) (Testimony of John G.
Roberts, Jr.). Judge Richard Posner has said that no "knowledgeable" person could
possibly believe that. RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 78 (2008); see also
LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE: LAW AS CULTURE IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY
37 (1989) (suggesting that the judge's role may be "like the third of those three kinds
of baseball umpires that Hadley Cantril humorously spoke of in an early work on
social psychology: the first is the umpire who says: 'There's balls and there's strikes
and I calls 'em as they are'; the second says: 'There's balls and there's strikes and I calls
'em as I sees 'em'; but the third says: 'There's balls and there's strikes and they ain't
nothin' till I calls 'em."'); Susan A. Bandes, Empathy and Article III: Judge Weinstein,
Cases and Controversies, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 317, 323 (2015) (" [Judicial candidates
and judges have little incentive to acknowledge that they have interpretive leeway, and
that this leeway permits value judgments.").
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interpretation and legal reasoning, and that they must be amenable to
professional evaluation and criticism. 110 But that is not what the
Senators and nominees typically mean to say when they talk about
"law all the way down." What they actually mean to affirm is that the
law is certain, and that absolutely correct answers to legal questions
can be found through reason and logic. On this view, there is no need
for interpretation, and the character, life experience, judgment, and
imagination of the judge are irrelevant to the process of adjudication.
But we have been told that the resolution of constitutional questions
entails more than that since the earliest days of the Republic, when
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that, "The judgment is so much
influenced by the wishes, the affections, and the general theories of
those by whom any political proposition is decided, that a contrariety
of opinion on . .. great constitutional question[s] ought to excite no
surprise."111 And we have since been reminded of that truth by many
distinguished judges. Justice Frankfurter, who had a markedly more
circumscribed view of the judicial function, wrote that, "Since the
litigation that comes before the Supreme Court is so largely entangled
in public issues, the general outlook and juristic philosophy of the
Justices inevitably influence their views and in doubtful cases will
determine them." 112 justice Jackson emphasized that "the most
110 See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND
POETICS OF LAw 97 (1985) ("It is not a defect but a merit of our system that judges are
acknowledged to have discretion, that legal questions are seen as open and difficult,
that juries can decide within a wide range .... It is the aim of our law not to obliterate
individual judicial judgments ... but to structure and discipline them, to render them
public and accountable."); Morawetz, supra note 107, at 59 (explaining how judges
"are constrained individually by a particular way of addressing and understanding
interpretive questions and they are constrained collectively by the fact that the shared
practice embraces a limited range of ways of proceeding," and that "[t] his limitation is
mutually understood and recognized").
11 2 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF
THE AMERICAN FORCES, DURING THE WAR WHICH ESTABLISHED THE INDEPENDENCE OF His
COUNTRY, AND FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 205 (1835). Marshall also offered
an account of the "wishes, affections, and general theories" that influenced his
judgment: "I had grown up at a time when a love of union and resistance to the claims
of Great Britain were the inseparable inmates of the same bosom . . . . I carried them
with me into the army where I found myself associated with brave men from different
states who were risking life and everything valuable in a common cause believed by all
to be most precious; and where I was confirmed in the habit of considering America as
my country, and [Clongress as my government." JOHN MARSHALL, AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL
SKETCH 9-10 (John Stokes Adams ed., 1937) (footnote omitted).
112 FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND LIFE AND OTHER THINGS THAT MATTER: PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES OF FELlX FRANKFURTER, 1956-1963, at 59 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1965);
see also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52 (1949) ("And there comes a point where this
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important part of a Judge's work is the exercise of judgment,"" 3 and
Judge Learned Hand has said that "everything turns upon the spirit in
which [the judge] approaches the questions before him."114 More to
the point, perhaps, Justice O'Connor has written that Justice
Thurgood Marshall "imparted not only his legal acumen but also his
life experiences, constantly pushing and prodding [his colleagues] to
respond not only to the persuasiveness of legal argument but also to
the power of moral truth." 15 Properly understood, judging requires
that the judge "risk having a profound encounter with other people,
their ideas, and their problems."H 6
As Professor Bandes and others have pointed out, Safford Unified
School District No. I v. Redding1 7 illustrates the importance of a
Justice's individual perspective and insight. In Safford, a middle-school
student who was strip-searched at school alleged that her
constitutional rights had been violated:
To resolve the Fourth Amendment issue, the Court needed to
determine how intrusive the search was, how important the
government interest was, and whether the government
adopted a reasonable means of addressing its concern . . . . [Ilt
needed to focus on how [the search] was experienced by the
[student] and on how it would be experienced by others in her
place . . . . [I]t needed to put itself in the place of school
administrators. Unless the Court could understand the
perspectives of all the litigants, it risked making its
determination based on skewed and incomplete
information.118
At oral argument, the Justices spent much time attempting to
understand the school's viewpoint, but measurably less time trying to
understand the case from the student's perspective. While Justice
Breyer struggled with understanding the student's perspective,
wondering whether the girl's situation was similar to his own
experience as a young boy having to change clothes in a school locker
room, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the experience recounted by
Court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men.").
113 EUGENE GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON 59 (1958).
114 Learned Hand, Sources of Tolerance, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1930).
115 Sandra Day O'Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN.
L. REv. 1217, 1217 (1992).
116 Sullivan, Just Listening, supra note 29, at 412.
117 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
118 Bandes, Empathetic judging, supra note 28, at 143.
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Justice Breyer was nothing like the situation encountered by "a
thirteen-year-old girl forced to strip to her underwear and shake out
her bra and underpants in front of school officials who suspected her
of concealing prescription ibuprofen."11 9 As Professor Bandes notes,
"The resulting opinion reflects the Court's effort to educate itself on
[the student's] perspective. It acknowledges her subjective
experience . . . as 'embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating."1 20 The
Court's "fuller understanding" of the student's perspective did not
dictate the result, but it "allowed a more accurate balancing of
interests."121
As Safford suggests, life experience is not irrelevant to judging, and,
at least in multi-member courts, the possibility of meaningful dialogue
among judges may help them grasp the reality of situations far
removed from their own experiences.1 22 If judges are to perform their
professional work at all, they must be willing and able to imagine the
"situations and interests" of others, which "requires the openness and
humility to admit that other perspectives are worthy of respect."1 23
That is difficult for all of us. "For judges," Professor Bandes notes,
"these are acute problems, because judges are encouraged to believe in
their own omniscience. It is a real occupational hazard - the lack of
reminders that their perspective is partial; that they have blind spots
and prejudices."1 24
119 Id. at 143-44.
120 Id. at 144.
121 Id.
122 Whether the conditions necessary for such a dialogue are normally present is
another question. See generally Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice, Interrupte&
The Effect of Gender, Ideology, and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 VA.
L. REv. 1379 (2017) (discussing how interruptions may prevent effective dialogue
between Justices); Barry Sullivan & Megan Canty, Interruptions in Search of a Purpose:
Oral Argument in the Supreme Court, October Terms 1958-60 and 2010-12, 2015 UTAH
L. REv. 1005 (discussing recent changes in the conduct of oral argument in the
Supreme Court and its effectiveness).
123 Susan A. Bandes, Compassion and the Rule of Law, 13 INT'L J.L. CONTEXT 184,
194 (2017) [hereinafter Bandes, Compassion] ("People do not begin with abstract
principles. They begin with moral intuitions that grow from their own experience and
take shape within their own social worlds, and those intuitions prove pretty
unshakeable . . . . For people to re-examine their moral intuitions, or to try to expand
their moral universe, usually requires interchange with others who hold different
perspectives." (citations omitted)).
124 Id. at 192; see Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835-36 (1972) (memorandum
opinion of Rehnquist, J.) (pointing out that judges in our system come to the bench
relatively late in life and often have firmly held views about many legal issues).
1144 [Vol. 51:1105
The Power of Imagination
The ability to imagine the depth and reality of the "situations and
interests" of others, and to appreciate the limitations of one's own
perspective, is an essential vocational requirement for judges. But the
same is true for lawyers, as Professors Lasswell and McDougal
reminded us three-quarters of a century ago: "To no one else can
clients and . . . the public reasonably be expected to look for that
enlargement and correction of perspective, that critical and inclusive
view of reality, that is based on the disciplined exercise of
[professional] skills . . . ."125 To be an effective advocate, for example,
one cannot believe without proof everything that one is told by one's
client. On the other hand, a lawyer must not dismiss out-of-hand a
client's assertion that his confession was induced by torture simply
because that possibility seems inconceivablel2 6 to the lawyer or
inconsistent with her own experience with the police. 127 In other
words, lawyers must become habituated to thinking that what might
seem inconceivable in the context of their own lives might not be
inconceivable - but actually possible or even probable - in the lives
of their clients. Ideally, that process of habituation begins in law
school.
There are important parallels between what we hope goes on during
argument and in the conference room of a multi-member court, on the
one hand, and what should go on in a law school classroom, on the
other. In both venues, we hope that there is a genuine exchange of
views that results in real learning and the development of new insights
- which generally come from exposure to people whose ideas and
experiences are different from our own. When a law school classroom
works as it should, students will learn as much from each other as
from the instructor. The instructor will guide the discussion, to be
sure, but a large part of the instructor's role is to encourage students
(who often appear reluctant to contribute) to share their unique
insights with their colleagues and to build on each other's insights.
Diversity of every kind is important to that enterprise.
Fifty years ago, there was little diversity of background among
students in American law schools. White males dominated most
125 Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 2, at 211.
126 See NORMAN MALCOLM, LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: A MEMOIR 39 (1958) (quoting a
letter from Wittgenstein in which he recalled "a heated discussion [about the alleged
British plot to assassinate Hitler] in which [Malcom] made a remark about [its being
inconceivable because it was contrary to the British] 'national character' that shocked
[Wittgenstein] by its primitiveness").
127 See People v. Wilson, 506 N.E.2d 571, 572-77 (Ill. 1987) (reversing conviction
due to confession induced by police torture).
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aspects of American life, and, not surprisingly, young white males
filled most of the seats in American law schools. There were few
women, few members of minority groups, and few mature students. 2 8
Apart from men returning from military service, few had much
experience of life. That is no longer the case. Can there be any doubt
that classroom discussion has been enriched - and the quality of legal
education substantially enhanced - by the inclusion of these
additional voices?
Clearly, mature students who have worked in financial services have
much to contribute to business law classes; journalists may have
special insights into First Amendment issues; and police officers and
orthopedic surgeons and architects and state legislators all make
contributions to classroom discussion that would not have been made
before law schools began to accept mature students in substantial
numbers. Likewise, it is not difficult to imagine that students from
urban and rural areas and small towns may have unique perspectives
on a variety of legal issues. Students from modest financial
circumstances or chronically depressed communities may have
important insights into the regulation of payday loans and credit card
debt and the availability of consumer class action relief. Nor is it
difficult to imagine the ways in which the interventions of women and
members of minority groups may enrich classroom discussion.
Members of a constitutional law class may appear quite taken by
Justice Harlan's seemingly prophetic dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,129
for example, when an Asian-American student raises her hand and
asks that the class consider the way in which Justice Harlan discusses
the Chinese, which then leads other students to want to discuss the
Justice's observation that whites would remain the "dominant race."
Similarly, the discussion of "undue burden" in Whole Woman's Health
v. Hellerstedt13o may well take a different turn when an African-
American obstetrician in the class can be encouraged to speak from
her own professional experience, and some gay students may have
important interventions to make in a discussion of stare decisis and
countervailing claims of justice in connection with the class's
consideration of Bowers v. Hardwickl3' and Lawrence v. Texas.132 In
128 See, e.g., JOAN A. Lowy, PAT SCHROEDER: A WOMAN OF THE HOUSE 22-24 (2003)
(describing sexism at Harvard Law School when Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder
enrolled in 1961).
129 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
130 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
131 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
132 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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other words, there are some subjects relevant to the study of law about
which women and members of minority groups may have unique
perspectives. As Justice O'Connor noted in Grutter, minority students
should not be expected to speak as representatives of a particular
group because there is no single viewpoint that can be attached to any
particular group, and it would be both erroneous and harmful to think
that there is.133 However, it is also true, as Justice O'Connor also
observed in Grutter, that an individual's views are likely to be affected
by "one's own, unique experience of being a racial minority in
society,"l 34 and the same is certainly true of being a woman in a
particular society. Women can talk from first-hand experience
(whether it be personal to them or to others they know personally)
about such matters as sexual harassment and rape, 135 while others can
talk about the perils of "driving while Hispanic"1 36 and the experiences
that young black men often have of being hassled by the police. But
each of those students may have important insights to offer in
connection with discussions throughout the law school curriculum,
regardless of the subject matter. The larger point is that law school
classrooms can do what they need to do only by nurturing a wide
variety of viewpoints and encouraging many voices to be heard.
All of a law school's students benefit from the inclusion of many
voices. The matters discussed in law school, after all, are not merely
the stuff of good citizenship or personal development for law students
(although they are that, of course, just as they are for students in other
disciplines); they are the very stuff of professional knowledge and
formation and are essential to the development of the "professional
imagination" that is necessary both to the practice of law and to the
task of judging in a democratic society. They provide a necessary
foundation, as Justice Powell put it, for "render[ing] ... [a] vital
service to humanity."1 37
133 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003). Indeed, that fact lies at the
heart of the argument supporting the need for a "critical mass." See id.
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., Lynn K. Hall, What Happens When a Rape Goes Unreported, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/04/opinion/sunday/what-happens-
when-a-rape-goes-unreported.html?_r=o (showing how a rape victim can provide a
unique perspective and cause other victims to come forward).
136 See, e.g., Stuesse et al., supra note 57 (describing the experience of an
undocumented woman driving without a license).
137 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978).
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CONCLUSION
Legal education is a distinctive form of higher education with a
distinctive mission, a distinctive set of concerns, and a distinctive
pedagogy. While strong arguments can be made for racial and ethnic
diversity throughout higher education, based on concerns for
individual human development and the cultivation of good citizens,
distinctive arguments can be made for diversity in professional
education, as Justice Powell recognized in Bakke. Special arguments
can be made for legal education, based on the nature of the
professional work that lawyers and judges do and on what appropriate
training for that work ought to entail. Lawyers and judges must be
able to appreciate the limitations of their own perspectives 38 and
understand "the situations and interests of people very different from
ourselves." 39 By failing to emphasize the distinctive arguments that
were available in Grutter, Justice O'Connor left the dissenters in that
case free to define legal practice and legal education in their own terms
- which made diversity of any kind irrelevant.
Perhaps Justice O'Connor should have taken more seriously her
own insight into the importance of context, and perhaps we should do
so in the future. The Grutter majority affirmed the approach taken by
Justice Powell in Bakke, but that precedent continues to be unstable,
as demonstrated by the Court's having granted certiorari twice in
Fisher. Given the continued apparent fragility of the relevant
jurisprudence, it might make sense for future litigants and courts to
focus on context at a more granular level and dig more deeply in every
case to ensure that the First Amendment values at the heart of Bakke
continue to be given appropriate effect.
138 See Bandes, Compassion, supra note 123, at 194.
139 Fiss, supra note 104, at 142 (quoting Carlos Nino).
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